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NOTES
THE LIABILITY OF A PRINCIPAL FOR THE FRAUD
OF HIS AGENT COMMITTED FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE AGENT.
It is doubtful whether there is any question of law upon
which there is a more direct conflict of authority in the United
States than on the question of the liability of a principal
where his agent commits a fraud within the apparent scope
of the authority, and under cover of the principal's name and
business, but for the benefit of the agent.
This conflict of judicial opinion is well illustrated in two
classes of cases: (1) Where the agent fraudulently issues
stock certificates and sells them for his own benefit; (2)
where the agent fraudulently issues bills of lading and sells
them for his own benefit.
In England it seems to be established that the principal
is never liable under such circumstances. The leading case
on the subject is British Mutual Banking Co. v. the Charn-
wood Forest Railway Co.' In this case the secretary of a
company answered questions which were put to him" as secre-
tary as to the validity of certain debenture stock of the com-
pany. The answers were untrue and were fraudulently made
by the secretary for his own benefit. In an action against
the company for loss arising from the representations, the
jury found that the secretary was held out by the company
as a person to answer such inquiries in their behalf, but on
appeal from the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, it
was held that a principal is not liable in an action of deceit
for the unauthorized and fraudulent act of a servant or agent
committed, not for the general or special benefit of the prin-
1. L. R. 18 Q B. iy. 714.
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cipal, but for the servant's or agent's private ends. In the
opinion on the case, Lord Esher, M. R., said, "Although what
the secretary said related to matters about which he was
authorized to give answers, he did not make the statements
for the defendant but for himself. I know of no case where
the employer has been held liable when his servant has made
statements not for his employer, but in his own interest."
Fry, L J., in his opinion stated, "It is plain that the action
cannot succeed on any ground of estoppel for otherwise the
defendants would be estopped from denying that the stock
was good. No corporate body can be bound to do something
beyond their powers. The action, therefore, cannot be sup-
ported on that ground. Nor can it be supported on the ground
of direct authority to make the statements. Neither can it
be supported on the ground that the company either benefited
by or accepted or adopted any contract induced or produced
by the fraudulent misrepresentation. I can see no ground for
maintaining the action."
Cox, Patterson & Co. v. Bruce & Co.,2 decided the same point
in regard to a fraudulent bill of lading. A bill of lading signed
by the captain of a ship in respect of a shipment of bales of jute
stated that there were more bales of the higher grade of jute
than there really were, and it was held that an indorsee of the
bill of lading for value, without notice of the incorrectness of
the description of the bales had no right of action against the
shipowners either for breach of contract or upon the ground
that they were estopped by the representation contained in
the bill of lading. Another English case, Grant v. Norway,"
held that the principal was not liable for a fraudulent bill of
lading issued for the benefit of the agent and the argument
of the Court was that the agent is authorized to do what is
usual in his agency and it is not usual to issue fraudulent
bills of lading.
2. 1. R. 18 Q. B. Div. 147.
3. 10 C. &. 665.
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LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR FRAUD OF AGENT
In the United States two opposite views are taken. The
English rule on the subject has been followed in the de-
cisions by the U. S. Supreme Court. This rule was laid down
in Friedlander v. Texas Pacific Railway Co.,' which decided
that where a station agent having authority to sign bills of
lading, by collusion with a pretended shipper, issues a bill of
lading of goods which are not delivered for transportation
and which have no existence, and the shipper negotiates it
for value to a third person, who is ignorant of the facts, the
railroad company is not liable on the bill to the purchaser;
the fraud of the agent being outside the scope of his em-
ployment, as he could only issue bills for property delivered.
Part of the opinion of Chief Justice Fuller was, "Easton
(the agent) was not the company's agent in the transaction
for there was nothing upon which the agency could act. The
fraud was in respect to a matter within the scope of Easton's
employment or outside it. It was not within it, for bills of
lading could onlv be issued for merchandise delivered; and
being without it, the company which derived and could derive
no benefit from the unauthorized and fraudulent act, cannot
be made responsible."
The case of Pollard v. Vinton,5 also decides that neither
the master of a steamboat, nor its shipping agents at points
on the interior where cargo is received and delivered, can,
by giving a bill of lading for goods not received for shipment,
bind the vessel or its owner and such bill is void even in the
hands of a transferee in good faith and for value.
This English (Supreme Court) doctrine is the rule in Mis-
souri. In the case of Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Laveille,6 it was
decided that the owners of a boat were not liable, at the suit
of a third party, in consequence of a bill of lading having been
issued for goods as shipped on board that boat by one appar-
4. 130 U. S. 416.
5. 105 U. S. 7.
6. 52 Mo. 380. Also Minnesota, Maryland. Louisiana and Washington
decisions to the same effect.
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ently having authority therefor, to the consignor named in
the bill of lading, who negotiated a bill of exchange drawn on
the consignee to such third party, who purchases and has in.
dorsed to him for value the bill of exchange on the faith and
on the security of the bill of lading, which is also transferred
to him, without any knowledge or notice of lack of authority
on the part of him who signed the bill of lading, or that the
goods recited in the bill of lading were never shipped.
In 1890 in the ease of the National Bank of Commerce v.
Chicago, B. & N. Ry. Co.," the Supreme Court of Minnesota
held that a bill of lading issued through fraud, mistake, or
negligence by an agent of a common carrier for property not
received, subjects the carrier to no liability, even to a bona
fide indorsee for value.
This decision was upheld in the case of Swedish-American
Nat. Bank v. C. B. & Q. Ry.,' deciding that a carrier, even as
to an innocent indorsee, is not estopped by statements in its
bill of lading issued by its agents from showing that no goods
were in fact received for transportation unless by his usual
mode of doing business he had given authority to his agents
to issue bills of lading for goods not received.
It has also been decided in Minnesota, Dunn v. State Bank
of Minneapolis," that where the president of a bank purchased
increased stock of the bank by the use of funds of a city of
which he was treasurer, the bank is not responsible for his
false representations to a third person purchasing the stock
from him.
In Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Wilkins,10 the Court de-
cided that a railroad company is not liable for advances made
by a commission merchant upon the faith of a bill of lading
fraudulently signed by one of its station agents; the goods
therein specified never having been shipped or received at
the depot for transportation.
7. 44 Minn. 224.
8. 96 Minn. 436.
9. 59 Minn 22L
10. 44 Md. 11-
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In Washington in 1906 it was decided in the case of Roy &
Roy v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.," that the act of a carrier's
agent in delivering a bill of lading for goods which he knew
were not delivered to the carrier, being beyond his authority,
does not bind the carrier even as to an innocent transferee or
pledgee notwithstanding, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. 493598,
making bills of lading negotiable by indorsement for certain
purposes.
The law is the same in Louisiana where, in the case of
Henderson v. Louisville & N. By. Co.,12 it was held that a rail-
road company is not bound by a bill of lading given by its
agent for sugar not received or delivered for transportation,
though the instrument has been transferred to a third person
for value in the usual course of business.
However, the opposite view, upholding the liability of the
principal upon the doctrine of estoppel, is taken in New York
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ohio, Nebraska, Kansas, South
Dakota, Alabama, and a number of other States. A lead-
ing New York case is Bank of Batavia v. New York, etc. Ry.
Co. s Here a local freight agent whose duty it was to receive
and forward freight over the defendant's road and give a bill
of lading therefor, but having no right to issue such bills ex-
cept upon the actual receipt of the property for transporta-
tion, issued fraudulent bills of lading to one Williams who
drew a draft on the consignee mentioned in the bills of lading
and procured the money upon it of the plaintiff by transfer-
ring the bills of lading to secure its ultimate payment. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to rely upon the rep-
resentation in the bills of lading that the goods were actually
shipped, and that the defendant was estopped to deny the
authority of the agent to issue the bills, since the act was
within the apparent scope of his authority. Finch, Justice,
11. 42 Waah. 572.
12. 116 L. 1047.
13. 106 N. Y. 195.
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said, "Where the principal has clothed his agent with power
to do an act upon the existence of some extrinsic fact neces-
sarily and peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and
of the existence of which the act of executing the power .is itself
a representation, a third person dealing with such agent in
entire good faith, pursuant to the apparent power, may rely
upon the representation, and the principal is estopped from
denying its truth to his prejudice."
In regard to false stock certificates the New York courts
also hold the principal liable. In Fifth Ave. Bank v. Forty-
Second Street & Grand Street Ferry Co.,14 it was decided
that where the secretary and treasurer of a corporation is also
its agent for the transfer of stock with power to countersign
and issue stock when signed by the president, the corporation
is bound by his representation that certain stock is genuine
though in fact it was fraudulently issued by him after forging
the president's signature thereto.
This New York doctrine was very strongly approved by
the Pennsylvania court in the case of Brooke v. N. Y., Lake
Erie & Western Ry. Co.15 In this case defendant was a rail.
road and its authorized shipping clerk at one of its stations
issued a bill of lading in the company's name for certain goods
that the company had never received. This bill came to the
hands of an innocent third person who. made advances ot
money upon it. Upon suit brought against the railroad to re-
cover such advances by the third party, the Court held that
the company was estopped by the act of its agent from denying
the receipt of the goods, although the clerk had no authority
to give bills of lading without receiving the goods, and al-
though the company had never done anything to lead anyone
to suppose that he had such authority. In his opinion on the
case Justice Sterrett stated, "The pjincipal is bound by all
the acts of his agent within the scope of the authority which he
14. 137 N. Y. 231. follows N. Y. & New Haven R. R. Co. v. Schyrer, 34
N. Y. 30-the leading New York case on the subject.
15. 108 Pa. St. 529.
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LTABI.ITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR FRAUD OF AGENT
held him out to the world to possess, notwithstanding th,
agent acted contrary to instructions; and this is especially th(
ease with officers and agents of corporations. The authority
of an agent to act for and bind his principal will be implied
from the accustomed performance by the agent of acts of the
same general character for the principal with his knowledge
and consent. These elementary principles are founded on the
doctrine that where one of two persons must suffer by the act
of a third person, he who has held that party out as worthy
of trust and confidence and as having authority in that matter
should be bound by it."
In the Kansas case of Wichita Savings Bank v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,1 the agent of a railroad had
authority to receive grain for shipment and issue in the name
of the corporation a single bill of Jading for each consignment
received. The agent issued two original bills of lading on
the same terms. One was negotiated to W. and the other
transferred to a bank, which, knowing the custom of the rail-
road company to issue only one bill of lading for each ship-
ment and relying wholly on the bill for its security with no
knowledge that another bill had been issued, advanced money
thereon in good faith and in the regular course of business. It
was held that the railroad company was estopped to deny that
it had received the grain mentioned in the bill of lading and
that it was liable to the indorsee and assignee for the advances
made thereon by the bank.
In Nebraska the same point was decided in the case of
Sioux City & Pacific Ry. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Fremont.'
Here an agent of a railroad company, authorized to issue bills
of lading, issued bills to a certain shipper for five cars of
wheat. In fact less than one carload of wheat and about the
same amount of barley was shipped. Drafts were drawn by
the shipper against the bills and attached thereto and were
delivered to a bank which in good faith discounted the same
16. 20 'Kan 519.
17. 10 Nob. 65.6.
1.3
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and forwarded them for payment. The drafts being protested
and the shipper having absconded and leaving no property in
the State, it was held that, as against the bank, the railroad
company was estopped from denying that it had received the
wheat.
Fletcher v. Great Western Elevator Co.," decided that
a warehouseman whose agent fraudulently issues a receipt
for grain, which has not been received, is estopped to deny
that the grain mentioned in the receipt has been received, as
against a bona fide holder for value.
However, the doctrine of these latter cases which follow
the New York rule is subject to the qualification that the pur-
chaser must ae- in good faith and prudently; it is not good
faith or prudence to trust to the Tepresentation where the
agent is known to be acting for himself in the sale of stock,
Bank of New York City, etc. v. American Dock & Trust Co.19
Also the agent must be acting within the apparent scope
of the powers entrusted to him; an unauthorized seizure of
the powers as a means of fraud, where no authority to exer-
cise them exists, will not render the principal liable, Man-
hattan Life Ins. Co. v. Forty-Second St., etc. Ry. Co. 20
There are two instances in which the principal is prac-
tically universally held liable for the fraud of the agent, even
though committed for the benefit of the agent. They are the
case of a bank cashier who employs his power to draw checks,
for the purpose of converting the funds of the bank to his
own use, and the case of an agent of a telegraph company who
employs his power to send telegrams as an operator in the
sending of forged telegrams requesting the transmission of
money. Two cases which illustrate these two points are
Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank,2 ' and McCord v. Western
Union Tel. Co.22
18. 12 S. D. 643.
19. 143 N. Y. 539.
20. 139 N. Y. 146.
21. 140 N. Y. 556.
22. 39 Minn. 181.
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In the New York case it was decided that a bank cashier
who employs his powers to draw checks, for the purpose of
converting the funds of the bank to his own use, is using a
trust and confidence reposed in him by the bank and the loss
must fall on it rather than on innocent parties. Here the
Court said: "If his (the agent's) position and the confidence
reposed were such as to enable him to escape detection for
a while, then the consequences of his fraudulent acts should
fall upon the bank, whose directors, by their misplaced confi-
dence and gift of powers, made them possible, and not upon
others who, themselves acting innocently and in good faith,
were warranted in believing the transaction to have been one
coming within the cashier's powers."
The Minnesota case laid down the rule that the agent of
a telegraph company who employs his power to send tele-
grams as an operator in the sending of forged telegrams re-
questing the transmission of money, is abusing a trust and
confidence placed in him by the company, and the latter,
rather than the innocent receiver of the telegram, should
bear the loss. Part of the opinion was, "Persons receiving
dispatches in the usual course of business, when there is noth-
ing to excite suspicion, are entitled to rely upon the presump-
tion that the agents entrusted with the performance of the
husiness of the company have faithfully and honestly dis-
clirged the duty owed by it to its patrons, and that they
would not knowingly send a false or forged message; and it
would ordinarily be an unreasonable and impractical rule to
require the receiver of a dispatch to investigate the integrity
and fidelity of the defendant's agents in the performance of
their duties, before acting."
The result of the whole matter is this: One class of cases
insists upon the hard and fast rule that the fraud must be for
the principal's benefit in order to render him liable, while
the other class of cases gives to that fact only an evidential
force in determining the decisive question whether the repre-
sentation was so far within the scope of the agent's ostensible
authority as to warrant third persons in relying upon it.
125
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
The latter view appears to be more nearly in accord with
the general principles of agency, and even the courts, which
hold the other doctrine, recognize the essential justice of this.
In the case of National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, etc.
Ry., 2 the Court (referring to the doctrine of estoppel in pais
in respect to the cases where the fraud of the agent is com-
mitted within the apparent scope of the authority of his prin-
cipal, but for his own benefit) said, "If the question was res
integra we confess that it seems to us that this argument
would be very cogent." V~z~xi W. VA-c, '23.
Note-The above question in regard to fraudulent bills of
lading has now been settled in respect to interstate commerce
by a Federal statute and in respect to intrastate commerce in
those States which have passed the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act, but the question in regard to fraudulent issues of certifi-
cates of stock has never been dealt with by statute and the law
on the subject is still in the uncertain state related above.
The Federal Statute (Barnes Federal Code, See. 7999) is
as follows:
Liability for Non-Receipt or Misdescription of Goods--If
a bill of lading has been issued by a carrier, or on his behalf
by an agent or employee the scope of whose actual or appar-
ent authority includes the receiving of goods and issuing bills
of lading therefor, for transportation in commerce among the
several States and with foreign nations, the carrier shall be
liable to (a) the owner of goods covered by a straight bill
subject-to existing right of stoppage in transitu or (b) the
holder of an order bill, who has given value in good faith, re-
lying upon the description therein of the goods, for damages
caused by the non-receipt by the carrier of all or a part of
the goods or their failure to correspond with the description
thereof in the bill at the time of its issue.
The Uniform Bills of Lading Act adopted in both Missouri
23. 44 Minn 224.
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(R. S. Mo. 1919, See. 13545) and Illinois (. S. Ill. 1913, Chap.
27, q24) reads as follows: Liability for Non-Receipt or Mis-
description of Good&-If a bill of lading has been issued by a
carrier or on his behalf by an agent or employee, the scope of
whose actual or apparent authority includes the issuing of
bills of lading, the carrier shall be liable to--
(a) The consignee named in a non-negotiable bill, or
(b) The holder of a negotiable bill,
who has given value in good faith relying on the description
therein of the goods, for damages caused by the non-receipt
by the carrier or a connecting carrier of all or a part of the
goods or their failure to correspond with the description
thereof in the bill at the time of its issue. If, however, the
goods are described in a bill merely by a statement of marks
or labels upon them or upon packages containing them, or by
a statement that the goods are said to be goods of a certain
kind or quantity, or in a certain condition, or it is stated in
the bill that packages are said to contain goods of a certain
kind or quantity or in a certain condition, or that the contents
or the condition of the contents of packages are unknown, or
words of like purport are contained in the bill, such state-
ments, if true, shall not make liable the carrier issuing the
bill, although the goods are not of the kind or quantity or in
the condition which the marks or labels upon them indicate,
or of the kind or quantity or in the condition they were said
to be by the consignor. The carrier may also, by inserting in
the bill the words "shipper's load and count" or other words
of like purport, indicate that the goods were loaded by the
shipper and the description of them made by him; and if such
statement be true, the carrier shall not be liable for damages
caused by the improper loading or the non-receipt or by the
.misdescription of the goods described in the bill. V. W. V.
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